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Abstract
Moral elevation has been shown to increase helping behavior. However, this might be due to a threatened moral self-image
because people engage in a social comparison with a moral exemplar and conclude that their own moral integrity is inferior.
Alternatively, feelings of elevation might provide a motivational impetus to act on one’s moral values. We provided participants
with an opportunity to engage in self-affirmation, which was followed by an induction of moral elevation or a neutral control
mood. Compared to the neutral mood, participants experiencing moral elevation showed higher levels of helping behavior fol-
lowing self-affirmation. This effect was especially pronounced in participants experiencing moral elevation, who reminded them-
selves of previous prosocial behavior; they showed more helping than participants experiencing moral elevation, who had not
engaged in self-affirmation. Thus, rather than posing a threat to moral self-worth, feelings of elevation can provide the motivational
trigger to act on affirmed moral values.
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It is a rare person who does not think of himself or herself as
morally upstanding and full of integrity. Even mass murderers,
pedophiles, and other criminals seem to be able to convince
themselves that they have positive moral qualities. Recent
research has explored how people regulate their moral self-
worth over time in the face of obvious moral transgressions
(Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Converging evidence sug-
gests that on some implicit level people appear to keep track of
their own moral behavior, as if they accumulate ‘‘moral cred-
its’’ when doing something good, credits which they later
‘‘cash in’’ when doing something immoral. Thus, when people
are reasonably sure of their moral integrity, they have little
motivation to do further good, a phenomenon termed ‘‘moral
licensing’’ (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Merritt, Effron, & Monin,
2010; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin,
2009; Zhong et al., 2009). In the first clear demonstration of
this effect, Monin and Miller (2001) gave some participants
an opportunity to affirm their credentials as nonprejudiced peo-
ple, for example, by disagreeing with sexist statements. In sub-
sequent tasks, those participants exhibited more prejudicial
opinions than participants who did not have the earlier oppor-
tunity of showing themselves to be unbiased. Similar effects
have been shown involving political attitudes, such that partici-
pants who in one task indicated a voting preference for Barak
Obama showed a positive prejudice toward Whites in a subse-
quent task (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009).
Further research has shown that moral licensing effects
occur when people merely think of concepts relating to a
positive self-image (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Participants who
copied positive trait words and used them in a story about
themselves indicated they would donate less to a charity and
cooperate less in an environmental task than participants who
wrote a story involving neutral words. Presumably, thinking
about their positive qualities affirmed participants’ moral
integrity, and as a consequence, reduced any desire to engage
in prosocial behavior. These findings suggest that making
salient positive or negative traits can be enough to result in
moral licensing effects; actually engaging in a moral action
is not necessary. Although Sachdeva and colleagues (2009)
did not explicitly interpret their findings in this way, their
work can be viewed as applying the general principle of
self-affirmation when facing threat (McQueen & Klein,
2006; Steele, 1988) to the moral domain. Indeed, a central
consideration within self-affirmation theory is that people
want to protect the integrity of their concept of self (Sherman
& Cohen, 2006).
Such findings regarding moral licensing paint a rather pes-
simistic picture of human nature: On many occasions people
may only act morally because it allows them to restore their
own self-worth after it had been challenged. In other words,
prosocial behaviors such as altruism might often be merely
selfish, because once one feels like a morally superior person,
there is no need to prove this fact any further. Sachdeva and
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colleagues (2009) end their article with the question ‘‘How
does one avert the danger of moral licensing?’’ (p. 528) We
propose a possible answer, one that involves eliciting elevation,
a positive moral emotion.
Elevation describes the subjective experience when obser-
ving others perform acts of moral excellence such as kindness
or heroism, namely behaviors that benefit others while incur-
ring a cost to the person performing them (Haidt, 2003). When
experiencing elevation, people describe feeling inspired and
uplifted, and, importantly, having the motivation to become a
better person (Haidt, 2003). People specifically report an urge
of wanting to do good (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Landis et al.,
2009), and direct evidence for the link between elevation and
helping behavior was provided by Schnall, Roper, and Fessler
(2010). Participants watched an elevating clip from the ‘‘Oprah
Winfrey Show’’ in which a music teacher mentored a young
man from an impoverished background and played a major part
in turning him away from a potential life of crime. Compared to
participants who watched a neutral control clip or one eliciting
general positive affect, participants who watched the elevation
clip demonstrated a higher level of prosocial behavior, as indi-
cated by their willingness to volunteer for further unpaid stud-
ies or to help an experimenter by completing a boring task.
Similarly, Freeman, Aquino, and McFerran (2009) showed that
elevation, induced by watching clips and reading stories about
extraordinary acts of forgiveness, increased donations to a
charity for the advancement of education of Black students
among White individuals high in social dominance orientation,
which is normally liked by racist attitudes. Further, people for
whom moral identity is central to the self-concept report higher
feelings of moral elevation when faced with moral excellence
than people for whom moral identity is less important, and
these feelings, in turn, predict the desire to engage in proscocial
behavior (Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011). All these find-
ings suggest that moral elevation can have highly beneficial
consequences because it inspires people to do good things.
However, in the light of the findings reviewed above con-
cerning moral licensing (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Merritt
et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009;
Zhong et al., 2009), it may be that the increased prosocial beha-
vior observed after experiencing elevation is the result of feel-
ing a threat to one’s moral self-worth. Monin (2007) proposes
that observing exceptional moral behavior may trigger an
upward social comparison, resulting in the conclusion that the
perceiver’s own morality may be lacking. One response to this
threat is to engage in a behavior that restores one’s self-worth,
such as helping somebody in need. Thus, when people are
given the opportunity to reaffirm their own moral value when
feeling elevated, they might subsequently be less likely to help.
Alternatively, when reminded of their own positive traits and
moral convictions, feeling elevated might provide people with
the motivation to act on their moral beliefs, thus empowering
them to act in line with their values. Indeed, Crocker, Niiya,
and Mischowski (2008) showed that self-affirmation produces
other-directed emotions of self-transcendence, such as love and
caringAQ3 . They found that when writing an essay about their most
treasured value, participants reported higher levels of love,
feeling of giving and empathic than participants writing about
a low-importance value AQ4. Because of its inherent motivational
component to inspire people to do good, as an other-directed,
in fact, ‘‘other-praising’’ emotion (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), ele-
vation might provide a special opportunity to turn one’s core
values into action.
The Current Research
This experiment tested the potential consequences of experien-
cing elevation following a reminder of positive aspects of one’s
self-concept. Participants engaged in self-affirmation or a neu-
tral control task and then were induced to experience either
moral elevation or a neutral mood. Subsequently an opportu-
nity to engage in helping behavior was presented that was
ostensibly unconnected to the experiment itself. Two outcomes
were considered possible: Following the logic of moral licen-
sing (Sachdeva et al., 2009), participants experiencing moral
elevation should only engage in increased helping behavior if
they did not previously affirm their own positive qualities but
not when they did. Alternatively, following the logic of self-
affirmation as a reminder of core values (Crocker, Niiya, &
Mischowski, 2008), relative to being in a neutral mood, when
experiencing elevation with its inspirational effect to become
a better person, participants should show increased helping
behavior after having reminded themselves of their own posi-
tive qualities. If the second possibility was supported, the effect
should be especially pronounced for participants who during
the self-affirmation task considered their previous moral (i.e.,
prosocial) behavior rather than other positive qualities of a
more selfish nature.
Method
Participants
Eighty female1 participants recruited from the University of
Plymouth participated as part of a psychology course require-
ment or for payment of £6. Data from three participants were
excluded because of suspicion about the study purpose and
from one additional participant because she failed to show up
for an earlier time slot and consequently may have felt under
some obligation to make it up to the experimenter.
Materials
Film clips for emotion induction. In the experimental condition,
participants watched the 7-minute Oprah Winfrey clip previ-
ously used to induce elevation (Silvers & Haidt, 2008; Schnall,
Roper, & Fessler, 2010). In the control condition, participants
watched a 7-minute segment of ‘‘The Open Ocean’’ nature doc-
umentary by David Attenborough (1984), as previously used
by Schnall et al. (2010).
Self-affirmation manipulation. Modeled after earlier studies
(Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Jordan & Monin, 2008),
instructions for the ‘‘self-affirmation’’ condition were ‘‘Please
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write about a recent experience in which you demonstrated one
of your most personally valued qualities and felt good about
yourself. Examples of ‘personally valued qualities’ might
include such things as artistic skills, sense of humor, spontane-
ity, athletic ability, musical talent, creativity or business skills.’’
Instructions for the ‘‘no self-affirmation’’ condition were
‘‘Please describe your typical journey from home to the univer-
sity. Try to mentally walk through your route from door to door
and be as detailed as you can in your description. Examples of
what might be included are landmarks, street names, and length
of time taken on each part of the route.’’
Procedure
Participants were tested individually by a female experimenter
and randomly assigned to one of four conditions, crossing ele-
vation versus control emotion with self-affirmation versus no
self-affirmation. As a cover study, participants were told that
the research tested ‘‘memory for subjective versus objective
experiences’’ and that they would complete one or more writ-
ing tasks and watch a film clip. After being seated at a com-
puter cubicle they performed the first writing task for 5 min,
which in fact manipulated self-affirmation. Then participants
watched either the elevation or control emotion clip.2 The
remaining procedure followed Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) and
Schnall et al. (2010, Experiment 2) and involved the next part
of the experiment, a computer task, being rigged to fail, and the
participant was told she was free to leave while still receiving
full course credit or payment. Thus, the study that participants
expected to last for 1 hr ostensibly ended after just about 15
minutes. Before the participant got ready to leave the room,
however, the experimenter asked whether she would be willing
to help her by completing a long and somewhat boring math
questionnaire. If she agreed she was told to complete as much
of the questionnaire as she wished, and that any amount of help
would be greatly appreciated. Completion time of the question-
naire was secretly timed by the experimenter. Participants were
then questioned regarding suspicions about the true nature of
the experiment and were debriefed.
Results
Two sets of analyses were conducted. First we tested the basic
notion that self-affirmation qualifies the effect ofmoral elevation.
Additional analyses subsequently compared the self-affirmation
conditions regarding the content of affirmed qualities that par-
ticipants spontaneously produced, distinguishing between proso-
cial and selfish positive qualities.
A two-way between-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted with minutes spent on the questionnaire as
dependent variable and emotion (elevation vs. control) and
self-affirmation (self affirmation vs. control) as independent
variables. Replicating earlier finding (Schnall et al., 2010),
there was a main effect of emotion condition, such that partici-
pants in the elevation condition (M ¼ 34.34, SD ¼ 14.32)
spent significantly more time, helping the experimenter by
completing the questionnaire than participants in the neutral
control condition (M ¼ 27.52, SD ¼ 13.56), F(1, 72) ¼ 4.21,
p ¼ .04, Zp2 ¼ .06 (see Figure 1). No main effect was obtained
for self-affirmation, F(1, 72)¼ .02, p¼ .89, but critically, there
was an interaction between Emotion and Self-Affirmation,
F(1, 72) ¼ 4.05, p ¼ .05, Zp2 ¼ .05. Planned comparisons
showed that participants in the elevation condition who had
completed the self-affirmation helped for longer (M ¼ 37.14,
SD ¼ 14.54) than participants who had self-affirmed but were
in the control condition (M ¼ 24.30, SD ¼ 12.77), F(1, 72) ¼
8.25, p ¼ .005, d ¼ .94. We further compared the elevation
condition regarding whether there was a difference in self-
affirmation. Although the means suggested that elevation
following self-affirmation (M ¼ 37.14, SD ¼ 14.54) resulted
in more helping than elevation without prior self-affirmation
(M ¼ 31.22, SD ¼ 13.81), this planned comparison did not
reach statistical significance, F(1, 72) ¼ 1.75, p ¼ .18, d ¼
.42. However, this could be due to the self-affirmation instruc-
tions having led to a variety of qualities being recalled, with
some relating to positive moral values, whereas others relating
to other skills or abilities without a prosocial theme. Thus, we
proceeded to conduct follow-up analyses that took into account
the competence domain that participants had written about dur-
ing the self-affirmation task.
Self-affirmation content. Participants’ affirmation narratives
were classified by two independent coders (who were blind
to emotion condition) into whether they were involved in help-
ing behavior, defined as another person benefiting from the
actions of the participant (e.g., helping a friend who was ill),
or were essentially selfish in nature, defined as descriptions
of skills or behaviors that did not promote another person’s
well-being (e.g., completing a jungle trek). The analysis above
was broken down further by self-affirmation content, and
planned comparisons were conducted (see Figure 2 for means).
Participants who wrote about helping-related values spent sig-
nificantly more time on the helping task if they were in the ele-
vation emotion condition than if were in the control emotion
condition, F(1, 70)¼ 9.06, p¼ .004, d¼ 1.48. Helping was not
as high for participants who affirmed selfish skills and talents,
Figure 1. Minutes spent completing boring questionnaire to help
experimenter.
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reducing the effect between the elevation condition and the
control emotion condition to being marginally significant,
F(1, 70) ¼ 3.01, p ¼ .09, d ¼ .72. Further, participants in the
elevation condition who engaged in prosocial self-affirmation
differed from those who did not engage in self-affirmation,
F(1, 70) ¼ 4.13, p ¼ .05, d ¼ .84. Thus, the empowering
effect of elevation following self-affirmation was especially
pronounced when participants had reminded themselves of
previous prosocial behaviors. In contrast, self-affirmation
content did not matter for participants in the control emotion
condition, whose relatively low level of helping did not differ
for prosocial compared to selfish affirmations, F(1, 70) ¼ .09,
p ¼ .76, d ¼ .15.
Discussion
The results of this experiment suggest that experiencing the
emotion of elevation can propel people to put into action the
core moral values after they had become salient to them: Parti-
cipants who first reminded themselves of a positive quality that
they possessed and then watched an elevating clip engaged in
more helping behavior than participants who self-affirmed and
then watched a clip with relatively neutral content. Further,
when specifically taking into account the type of qualities that
participants self-affirmed, we found that having affirmed previ-
ous prosocial behavior resulted in the highest level of helping
behavior in combination with the feeling of moral elevation.
Although it would have been equally plausible that helping
behavior is reduced under conditions of self-affirmation and
moral elevation, similar to the reported effects of moral licen-
sing (Zhong et al., 2009), this was not the case.
Before we draw conclusions of our findings, several possi-
ble confounding factors need to be considered. First, although
it would have been preferable to include a mood measure of
elevation and other feelings as a manipulation check, the nature
of the design made it difficult to assess mood at an appropriate
time. In our previous work (Schnall et al., 2010), we did admin-
ister a manipulation check immediately after the mood
induction, but this was less than optimal given that the
manipulation check preceded the assessment of the dependent
variable, namely participants’ helping behavior. Nevertheless,
this earlier work did provide strong evidence that the elevation
film clip led to significantly higher reports of feeling uplifted,
moved, having a warm feeling in the chest, and wanting to
become a better person than that of the neutral film clip, and
thus we assume that the intended feelings were also success-
fully elicited in the current experiment. Second, one might
object that because we only compared elevation to a control
condition, we cannot rule out that general positive affect played
a role. This was also an issue we addressed in detail in our ear-
lier research (Schnall et al., 2010): The elevation and neutral
conditions did not differ regarding reported happiness, and
more importantly, whereas participants’ elevation-relevant
feelings predicted subsequent helping, their happiness did not.
Finally, a concern might be that the helping behavior might
have been due to modeling or imitation rather than being the
results of feelings of elevation. This possibility can be ruled out
for two reasons: The helping behavior exhibited by participants
differed qualitatively from the behavior displayed in the
elevation-eliciting film clip, and further, effects on helping
were qualified by previous self-affirmation.
Our findings point to two components of engaging in proso-
cial behavior in the context of one’s moral self-concept and
moral elevation. First, rather than constituting a threat, the
self-affirmation provided participants with the knowledge that
they possess a particular positive quality (e.g., having helped
others in the past) and thus made accessible evidence of their
own ability to do good. Second, combined with this salience
of past good deeds, momentary feelings of elevation provided
the motivational impetus to act on this knowledge. Thus, our
findings provide evidence for a moral empowerment effect of
elevation. Indeed, Crocker et al. (2008) noted that self-
affirmation is less of an affirmation of the self than it is an affir-
mation of values of the self.
We believe that the domain in which self-affirmation occurs
is critical. Although self-affirmation theories (e.g., Steele,
1988) generally assume that the blow of a threat in one domain
is lessened by the reminder of one’s positive self-worth in
another, unrelated domain, in the context of elevation, a remin-
der of one’s values in the moral domain might serve as relevant
evidence that one is capable of certain good actions (Sherman
& Cohen, 2006). Indeed, the effect of elevation following
self-affirmation was most notable in participants whose prior
affirmation involved describing ways in which they had helped
others, rather than self-centered skills or talents. These might
have been participants for whom being a good, moral person
was an especially central and salient part of self-concept,
because they activated previous helping behaviors despite the
study instructions nudging them to think of personal qualities
such as artistic skills, athletic ability, or musical talent; in fact,
none of the examples listed in the instructions were of any pro-
social or social nature. Those participants who generated exam-
ples of previous moral behavior might find moral integrity as
more central to their own self-concept than other participants;
Figure 2. Minutes spent completing boring questionnaire to help
experimenter, grouped by self-affirmation content.
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indeed, individual differences have been established regarding
the extent to which people value being a moral person (Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011). In our
study, some participants spontaneously activated prosocial val-
ues when asked to engage in self-affirmation, but future studies
will need to determine whether people could be induced to do
so, thus systematically encouraging desirable helping behaviors.
Overall, our findings suggest that being focally aware of
one’s moral values while experiencing elevation can have the
powerful effect of translating a person’s moral beliefs into
action, thus shifting attention from one’s own moral self to
those in need who stand to gain from it.
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Notes
1. Because men might be more likely than women to engage in help-
ing when asked by a female experimenter (Eagly & Crowley,
1986), we only tested female participants. However, we expect our
observed effects generalize to men. Indeed, Crocker et al. (2008)
found that self-affirmation increased self-transcendent emotions
such as love and caring in men and women alike.
2. To test the contribution of thinking about the emotion induction,
subsequently half the participants were asked to write for five min-
utes about the content of the film, whereas the other half immedi-
ately continued with the next part of the experiment. When entered
as an additional factor into the ANOVA, there was no difference in
time spent helping between participants who wrote about the clip
(M ¼ 30.87, SD ¼ 13.04) and those who did not (M ¼ 30.60,
SD ¼ 15.48), F(1,72) ¼ 0.02, p < 0.89, nor was there any inaction
with emotion condition or self-affirmation, all ps > .29. Thus, this
aspect of the manipulation was considered unimportant and
dropped from further analyses.
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